We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated machines). In these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a machine for its execution, and intends to complete earliest possible. In an egalitarian objective, the social cost would be the maximal job completion time, i.e. the makespan of the schedule. In an utilitarian objective, the social cost would be the average completion time. Instead of studying one of those objectives, we focus on the more general class of k -norm (for some parameter k) on job completion times as social cost. This permits to balance overall quality of service and fairness. In this setting, a coordination mechanism is a fixed policy, which specifies how jobs assigned to a same machine will be scheduled. This policy is known to the players and influences therefore their behavior.
Introduction
With the development of the Internet, large-scale systems consisting of autonomous decision-makers (players) become more and more important. The rational behavior of players who compete for the usage of shared resources generally leads to an unstable and inefficient outcome. This creates a need for resource usage policies that guarantee stable and near-optimal outcomes.
From a game theoretical point of view, stable outcomes are captured by the concept of Nash equilibria. Formally, in a game with n players, each player j chooses a strategy x j from a set S j and this induces a cost c j (x) for player j depending all chosen strategies x. A strategy profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player can decrease its cost by an unilateral deviation, i.e., c j (x j , x −j ) ≥ c j (x) for every player j and x j ∈ S j , where x −j denotes the strategies selected by players different from j.
The better-response dynamic is the process of repeatedly choosing an arbitrary player that can improve its cost and let it take a better strategy while other player strategies remain unchanged. It is desirable that in a game the better-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium as it is a natural way that selfish behavior leads the game to a stable outcome. A potential game is a game in which for any instance, the better-response dynamic always converges [9] .
A standard measure of inefficiency is the price of anarchy (PoA). Given a game with an objective function and a notion of equilibrium (e.g pure Nash equilibrium), the PoA of the game is defined as the ratio between the largest cost of an equilibrium and the cost of an optimal profile, which is not necessarily an equilibrium. The PoA captures the worst-case paradigm and it guarantees the efficiency of every equilibrium.
The social cost of a game is an objective function measuring the quality of strategy profiles. In the literature there are two main extensively-studied objective functions: (i) the utilitarian social cost is the total individual costs; while (ii) the egalitarian social cost is the maximum individual cost. The two objective functions are included in a general class of social costs: the class of k norms of the individual costs, with utilitarian and the egalitarian social costs corresponding to the cases k = 1 and k = ∞, respectively. There is a need to design policies that guarantee the efficiency (e.g the PoA) of games under some specific objective function. Moreover, it would be interesting to come up with a policy, that would be efficient for every social costs from this class.
Coordination Mechanisms in Scheduling Games
In a scheduling game, there are n jobs and m unrelated machines. Each job needs to be scheduled on exactly one machine. We consider the unrelated parallel machine model, where each machine could be specialized for a different type of jobs. In this general setting, the processing time of job j on machine i is some given arbitrary value p ij > 0. A strategy profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is an assignment of jobs to machines, where x j denotes the machine (strategy) of job j in the profile. The cost c j of a job j is its completion time and every job strategically chooses a machine to minimize the cost. In the game, we consider the social cost as the k -norm of the individual costs. The social cost of profile x is C(x) = j c k j 1/k . The traditional 1 , ∞ -norms represent the total completion time and the makespan, respectively. Both objectives are natural. Minimizing the total completion time guarantees a quality of service while minimizing the makespan ensures the fairness of schedule. Unfortunately, in practice schedules which optimize the total completion time are not implemented due to a lack of fairness and vice versa. Implementing a fair schedule is one of the highest priorities in most systems [16] . A popular and practical method to enforce the fairness of a schedule is to optimize the k -norm of completion times for some fixed k, which usually is chosen as k small constant. By optimizing the k -norm of completion time, one balances overall quality of service and fairness, which is generally desirable. So the system takes into account a trade-off between quality of service and fairness by optimizing the k -norm of completion time [14, 16] .
A coordination mechanism is a set of scheduling policies, one for each machine, that determine how to schedule the jobs assigned to a machine. The idea is to connect the individual cost to the social cost, in such a way that the selfishness of the agents will lead to equilibria with small social cost. We distinguish between local, strongly-local and non-clairvoyant policies. These policies are classified in the decreasing order of the amount of information that ones could use for their decisions. Formally, let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a profile.
• A policy is local if the scheduling of jobs on machine i depends only on the processing times of jobs assigned to the machine, i.e., {p i j :
• A policy is strongly-local if the policy of machine i depends only on the processing times for this machine i for all jobs assigned to i, i.e., {p ij : x j = i}.
• A policy is non-clairvoyant if the scheduling of jobs on machine i does not depend on any processing time. Such a policy actually assigns CPU time slots to jobs, and is informed whenever some job completes. The resulting schedule then reflects the processing times of its jobs, even though the policy is not aware of them prior to the job completions.
In addition, a policy is anonymous if it does not use any global ordering of jobs or any global job identities. Note that for any deterministic policy, local job identities are necessary as a machine may need such information in order to break ties (a job may have different identities on different machines). Moreover, we call a policy non-waiting if the schedule contains no idle time between job executions. Instead of specifying the actual schedule, we rather describe a scheduling policy as a function, mapping every job j to some completion time c j (x). Such a policy is said feasible if for any profile x, there exists a schedule where job j completes at time c j (x). Formally, for any job j, we must have c j (x) ≥ j p ij where the sum is take over all jobs j with x j = x j , and c j (x) ≤ c j (x). Certainly, any designed deterministic policy needs to be feasible.
Overview & Contributions
Recently, Roughgarden [12] developed the smoothness argument, a unifying method to show upper bounds the PoA for utilitarian games. This canonical method is elegant in its simplicity and its power. Here we give a brief description of this argument.
A cost-minimization game with the total cost objective C(x) = j c j (x) is (λ, µ)-smooth if for every profile x and x * ,
The smooth argument [12] states that the robust price of anarchy (including the PoA of pure, mixed, correlated equilibria, etc) of a cost-minimization game is bounded by
We will make use of this argument to settle the equilibrium inefficiency in scheduling games. We will prove the robust PoA by applying the smooth argument to the game with C k (x) = j c k j (x) where C(x) is the k -norm social cost of Scheduling Games. The main difficulty in applying the smooth argument to Scheduling Games has arisen from the fact that jobs on the same machine have different costs, which is in contrast to Congestion Games where players incurs the same cost at the same resource. The key technique in this paper is a system of inequalities, called smooth inequalities, that are useful to prove the smoothness of the game. With the inequalities, we are able to analyze systematically and in unified manner the PoA of the game under different policies.
Our contributions are the following:
1. We study the equilibrium inefficiency for the k -norm objective function. We consider a nonclairvoyant policy EQUI that schedules the jobs in parallel using time-multiplexing, assigning each job an equal fraction of CPU time; and a strongly-local policy SPT that schedules the jobs non-preemptively in order of increasing processing times (with a deterministic tie-breaking rule for each machine) 1 . We prove that the PoA of the game under the non-clairvoyant policy EQUI is at most O(2 k ). Besides, the PoA of the game under the deterministic stronglylocal policy SPT is at most O(k). Moreover, any deterministic non-preemptive, non-waiting and strongly-local policy has a PoA at least Ω(k/ log k), which is close to the PoA of the game under the SPT policy. Hence, for any k -norm social cost, SPT is close to optimal among deterministic non-preemptive, non-waiting, strongly-local policy. (The cases k = 1 and k = ∞ are confirmed in [6] and [1, 8] , respectively.) If one considers theoretical evidence to classify algorithms for practical use then SPT is a good candidate due to its simplicity and theoretically guaranteed performance on any combination of the quality and the fairness of schedules.
2. We study the equilibrium inefficiency for the makespan objective function (e.g., ∞ -norm) for local policies by making connection between k -norm functions. First, we revisit policies BCOORD, CCOORD introduced in [3] . We give unified and simpler proofs based on the smooth arguments. With the highlight of this approach, we derive a new policy Balance (definition is given is Section 4). The game under that policy always admits Nash equilibrium and induces the PoA of O(log m) -the currently best performance among anonymous local policies that always possess pure Nash equilibria.
Objective Policy Pure Nash equilibria PoA Our results naturally extend to the case when jobs have weights and the objective is the weighted k -norm of completion times, i.e., ( j (w j c j (x)) k ) 1/k .
1 Formal definitions of EQUI and SPT are given in Section 3
Related results
The smooth argument has been formalized in [12] . It has been used to establish tight PoA of congestion games [11] , a fundamental class of games. The argument is also applied to prove bounds on the PoA of weighted congestion games [2] . Subsequently, Roughgarden and Schoppmann [13] have extended the argument to prove tight bounds on the PoA of atomic splittable congestion games for a large class of latencies. Coordination mechanisms for scheduling games was introduced in [4] where the makespan ( ∞ -norm) objective was considered. For the non-clairvoyant policies, Cohen et al. [5] studied the game under various policies and derived the policy EQUI that always admits a Nash equilibrium and has an optimal PoA. For strongly-local policies, Immorlica et al. [8] gave a survey on the existence and inefficiency of different policies such as SPT, LPT, RANDOM. Some tight bounds on the PoA under different policies were given. Azar et al. [1] initiated the study on local policies. They designed a non-preemptive policy with PoA of O(log m) and a preemptive policy that always admits an equilibrium and guarantees a PoA of O(log 2 m). Subsequently, Caragiannis [3] derived a non-anonymous local policy ACOORD and anonymous local policies BCOORD and CCOORD with PoA of O(log m), O(log m/ log log m) and O(log 2 m), respectively where the first and the last ones always admit a Nash equilibrium. Fleischer and Svitkina [7] showed a lower bound of Ω(log m) for all deterministic non-preemptive, non-waiting local policies.
Recently, Cole et al. [6] studied the game with total completion time ( 1 -norm) objective. They considered strongly-local policies with weighted jobs, and derived a non-preemptive policy inspired by the Smith's rule which has PoA = 4. This bound is tight for deterministic non-preemptive nonwaiting strongly-local policies. Moreover, some preemptive policies are also designed with better performance guarantee.
Organization
In Section 2, we state some smooth inequalities that will be used in settling the PoA for different policies. In Section 3, we study the scheduling game with the k -norm social cost. We define the policies SPT and EQUI, and prove their inefficiency. We also provide an lower bound on the PoA for any deterministic non-preemptive non-waiting strongly-local policy. In Section 4, we consider the makespan ( ∞ -norm) social cost for local policies. We revisit the policies BCOORD and CCOORD [3] ; define and analyze the performance of policy Balance. The proofs of all lemmas and theorems are either presented in the main corp of the paper or given in the appendix.
Smooth Inequalities
In this section, we show various inequalities that are useful for the analysis. Specifically, Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4 are applied directly to prove the PoA of policies SPT and EQUI, respectively in Section 3. The other lemmas are used to prove Lemma 2.3, Lemma 2.4 and theorems in Section 4.
First, we give a definition of Lambert W function that we use throughout the paper. For each y ∈ R + , W (y) is defined to be solution of the equation xe x = y. Note that, xe x is increasing with respect to x, hence W (·) is increasing.
Lemma 2.1 Let k be a positive integer. Let 0 < a(k) ≤ 1 be a function on k. Then, for any x, y > 0, it holds that
where α is some constant and
To show the claim, we equivalently prove that
We study the positive root z 0 of equation
For the sake of simplicity, we define the function g(k) such that
Note that e w/2 < 1 + w < e w for w ∈ (0, 1). For w := g(k)
k−1 , we obtain the following upper and lower bounds for the term (k − 1)a(k):
By definition of the Lambert W function and Equation (3), we get that
First, consider the case where lim k→∞ (k − 1)a(k) = ∞. The asymptotic sequence for W (x) as x → +∞ is the following:
This guarantees f (z 0 ) ≥ 0 and
for some constant α.
Second, consider the case where (k − 1)a(k) is bounded by some constants. So by (4), we have
Third, we consider the case where lim k→∞ (k − 1)a(k) = 0. We focus on the Taylor series W 0 of W around 0. It can be found using the Lagrange inversion and is given by
Thus, for k large enough
Note that the case (1a) of Lemma 2.1 could be used to settle the tight bound on the PoA of Congestion Games in which delay functions are polynomials with positive coefficients. [15] proved this case for a(k) = 1 and 
Lemma 2.2 It holds that
In the following, we prove inequalities to bound the PoA of the scheduling game. Remark that until the end of the section, we use i, j as the indices. The following is the main lemma to show the upper bound O(k) of the PoA under policy SPT in the next section.
Lemma 2.3 For any non-negative sequences (n
, and for any positive increasing sequence
Proof Denote r i = 1/q i for 1 ≤ i ≤ P . The inequality is equivalent to
For convenience set r P +1 = 0. This inequality could be written as
It remains to show Inequality (5). For convenience set A 0,j = 0 for any j. By Lemma 2.2, we have
Therefore,
since the sums telescope. Similarly, (k + 1)
. Thus, to prove Inequality (5), it is sufficient to prove that for all 1
Hence, we only need to argue that
Choose µ k = k+1 k+2 and apply case (1b) of Lemma 2.1 (now a(k) = (k+1) k(k+2) and (k − 1)a(k) is bounded by a constant), we deduce that: for λ k = Θ(α k (k+1) k ) where α is a constant, Inequality (6) holds.
The following is the main lemma to settle the bound O(2 k ) of the PoA under policy EQUI (the proof is in the appendix).
Lemma 2.4 For any non-negative sequences
, and for any positive increasing se-
norms of Completion Times
We study coordination mechanisms under two policies: (1) the strongly-local policy SPT that schedules jobs in increasing order of processing times; and (2) the non-clairvoyant policy EQUI that schedules the jobs in parallel using time-multiplexing, assigning each job an equal fraction of CPU time.
Policy SPT Let x be a strategy profile. Let ≺ i be an order of jobs on machine i, where j ≺ i j iff p ij < p ij or p ij = p ij and j is priority over j (machine i chooses a local preference over jobs based on their local identities to break ties). The cost of job j under the SPT [8] policy is
Policy EQUI Let x be a strategy profile. The cost of job j under the EQUI policy [5] is
Note that the two policies SPT and EQUI are feasible. Since all p ij could be written as a multiple of (a small precision) without loss of generality, assume that all jobs processing times (scaling by −1 ) are integers and upper-bounded by P .
Relationship between SPT and EQUI Lemma 3.1 For any A ≥ 0, p > 0 and k, N integer, it holds that
2 Let x be an assignment of jobs to machines. Then, the SPT policy minimizes the knorm of job completion times with respect to this assignment among all feasible policies. Moreover, the EQUI policy induces an objective value at most (2k + 2) 1/k times higher. Proof Let x and x * be two arbitrary profiles. We focus on a machine i. Let n 1 , . . . , n P be the numbers of jobs in x which are assigned to machine i and have processing times 1, . . . , P , respectively. Similarly, m 1 , . . . , m P are defined for profile x * . Note that n a and m a are nonnegative for 1 ≤ a ≤ P . Applying Lemma 2.3 for non-negative sequences (n a ) P a=1 , (m a ) P a=1 and the positive increasing sequence (a) P a=1 , we have:
Upper bounds of the PoA induced by SPT and EQUI
where α is a constant.
Observe that, by definition of the cost under the SPT policy (see page 9), the left-hand side (of the inequality above) is an upper bound for j:x * j =i c k j (x −j , x * j ), while the right-hand side is exactly
As the inequality above holds for every machine i, summing over all machines we have:
By the smooth argument,
. Moreover, by Lemma 3.2, the optimal schedule for any assignment could be done using the SPT policy. Therefore, the PoA is O(k).
Theorem 3.2
The PoA of EQUI with respect to the k -norm of job completion times is O(2 k ).
Proof Let x and x * be two arbitrary profiles. We focus on a fixed machine i. Let n 1 , . . . , n P be the numbers of jobs in x which are assigned to machine i and have processing times 1, . . . , P respectively. Similarly, m 1 , . . . , m P are defined for profile x * and machine i. Remark that n a and m a are nonnegative for 1 ≤ a ≤ P . By definition of cost under policy EQUI (see page 9), the cost of job j assigned to machine i in profile x can also express as c j (x) =
Applying Lemma 2.4 for non-negative sequences (n a ) P a=1 , (m a ) P a=1 and the positive increasing sequence (a) P a=1 , we have:
where α is a constant. Therefore, we deduce that
By smooth argument,
. Moreover, by Lemma 3.2, for any assignment profile the EQUI policy induces social cost within (2k+2) 1/k times the optimal schedule on the assignment according to the k -norm. Hence, the PoA is
Lower bounds of the PoA
Lemma 3.3 The PoA of EQUI with respect to the k -norm of job completion times is Ω(k/ log k).
Proof The construction is the same as in [5] . Let m be an integer. Define n j := Consider the strategy profile x in which half of the jobs in J j (1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1) are scheduled on machine j and the other half are scheduled on machine j +1 (the job in J m are scheduled on machine m). This strategy profile is a strong Nash equilibrium (see [5] for the proof). Observe that the cost of jobs in group J j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m are the same and equals
Hence, the social cost C(x) satisfies 
Consider a profile x * in which jobs in group J j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) are assigned to machine j. In this profile, every job has cost 2 except the job in J m with cost 1. Thus, the social cost C(x * ) satisfies
Therefore, the PoA is at least
Theorem 3.3 The PoA of any deterministic non-preemptive non-waiting strongly-local policy is Ω(k/ log k) with respect to the k -norm of job completion times.
Proof Using the technique described in [6] , it is sufficient to prove that the PoA of SPT is Ω(k/ log k). Consider the same construction in Lemma 3.3. The only difference is that now we partition each group J j into J 1 j ∪ J 2 j where |J 1 j | = |J 2 j | = n j /2. In machine j, jobs in sub-group J 1 j have higher priority in than the ones in J 2 j . Inversely, in machine j + 1, jobs in sub-group J 1 j have higher priority in than the ones in J 2 j . Consider the profile in which jobs in J 1 j and J 2 j (1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1) are assigned to machine j and j + 1 respectively (the job in J m is assigned to machine m). By the definition of priority and Lemma 3.3, this profile is an equilibrium (under SPT). Besides, by Lemma 3.2, the social cost of this profile under SPT is within (2k + 2) 1/k -fraction of that induced by EQUI. Notice that the optimal social cost under SPT is always upper-bounded by that under EQUI. Therefore, the PoA of SPT is Ω((2k + 2) −1/k · k/ log k) = Ω(k/ log k).
∞ -norms of Completion Times
We consider local policies for the makespan social cost. First, we revisit the policies BCOORD and CCOORD in [3] by giving simpler proofs in a unified manner that is based on the smooth argument and the smooth inequalities. With the highlight of this approach, we derive a policy Balance that gives the currently best performance among anonymous local policies which always admits a Nash equilibrium. For any profile x, the social cost C(x) = max j c j . Let x(i) = {j : x j = i} be the set of jobs assigned to machine i. Define L(x(i)) := j:x j =i p ij , L(x) := max i L(x(i)) for all machines 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Note that in an optimal assignment x * , C(x * ) = L(x * ). For each job j, denote q j := min{p ij : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} and define ρ ij := p ij /q j for all i, j. Moreover the following lemma guarantees that the restriction to m-efficient assignment is as efficient as in the case up to a constant.
Lemma 4.1 ([3])
Let y * be an optimal assignment. Then, there exits a m-efficient assignment x * such that L(x * ) ≤ 2L(y * ).
Policy BCOORD, Revisited
Let k be a positive integer. Under policy BCOORD [3] , in profile x in which job j chooses machine i, the completion time c j of j equals ρ 1/k ij L(x(i)) if ρ ij ≤ m and equals ∞ otherwise. As ρ ij ≥ 1, c j ≥ L(x(i)) for all jobs j assigned to machine i. So, the schedule of such jobs is feasible. Note that the game under the policy does not always possess a Nash equilibrium [3] . Lemma 4.2 Let x and x * be an equilibrium and an arbitrary m-efficient profile, respectively. Then, it holds that i j:
where α is a constant. 
Policy CCOORD, Revisited
For any integer k and any non-empty set A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } of non-negative reals. The function Ψ k is defined as the following
By an abuse of notation, we define L(A) = n i=1 a i . Note that Ψ 1 (A) = L(A). Under policy CCOORD [3] , in profile x in which job j chooses machine i, the completion time c j of j equals (ρ ij Ψ k (x(i))) 1/k if ρ ij ≤ m and equals ∞ otherwise. The game under policy CCOORD always admits a Nash equilibrium [3] .
Lemma 4.3 Let x be a Nash equilibrium. Then, for any m-efficient profile x * , it holds that
The PoA of the game under policy CCOORD is O(log 2 m) by choosing k = log m.
Policy Balance
Let x be a strategy profile. Let ≺ i be a total order on the jobs assigned to machine i. Formally, j ≺ i j if p ij < p ij , or p ij = p ij and j is priority over j (machine i chooses a local preference over jobs based on their local identities to break ties). Note that the policy does not need a global job identities (there is no communication cost between machines about job identities) and a job may have different priority on different machines. The policy is clearly anonymous.
The cost c j of job j assigned to machine i is defined as follows.
Observe that the cost c j (x) of job j satisfies
As that holds for every job j assigned to machine i, policy Balance is feasible.
Remark that even there is some similarity in the definition of Balance and policy ACCORD [3] , the latter is not anonymous. ACCORD uses a global job ordering in its definition and it makes use this order to prove the existence and inefficiency of Nash equilibria whereas Balance uses only local job identities in case of tie break (that is unavoidable for any policy).
Lemma 4.4
The best-response dynamic under the Balance policy converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof By the definition of the policy, any job j will choose a machine i such that ρ ij ≤ m. Moreover, since q j is fixed for each job j, the behavior of jobs is similar to that in the game in which the set of strategy of a player j is the same as in the former except for machines i with ρ ij > m. Moreover, in the new game, player j in profile x has cost c j (x) such that
Hence, it is sufficient to prove that the better-response dynamic in the new game always converges. The argument is the same as the one to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for policy SPT [8] .
Here we present a proof based on a geometrical approach.
First, define pos i (j) := 1 + |{j : j ≺ i j, 1 ≤ j = j ≤ n}| which represents the priority of job j on machine i. For a value u ∈ R + and a job index 1 ≤ t ≤ n, we associate to every profile x the quantity |x| u,t := |{j :
We use it to define a partial order ≺ on profiles. Formally x ≺ y if for the lexicographically smallest pair (u, t) such that |x| u,t = |y| u,t we have |x| u,t < |y| u,t . We show that the profile strictly increases according to this order, whenever a job changes to another machine while decreasing its cost. Let j be such a job changing from machine a in profile x to machine b, resulting in a profile y. We know that c j (y) < c j (x). Remark that only jobs j with x j = b might have the cost in y larger than that in x (by definition of the cost c ). Moreover, such job j with x j = b and j has a different costs in x and y, it must be j ≺ b j , which also implies c j (x) ≥ c j (y). In the same spirit, some jobs j with x j = a might decrease their cost, but not below c j (x).
Consider u = c j (y) and t = pos b (j). We have that |x| u ,t = |y| u ,t for all u < u and all t . If job j is the only job with processing time p bj among the ones {j : x j = b}, then |y| u,t = |x| u,t + 1. Otherwise, |y| u,t = |x| u,t for t < t and |y| u,t = |x| u,t + 1.
Therefore (u, t) is the first lexicographical pair where |x| u,t = |y| u,t and |y| u,t > |x| u,t . Hence, since the set of strategy profiles is finite, the better-response dynamic must converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. This completes the proof.
Remark that the game under Balance convergences fast to Nash equilibria in the best-response dynamic (the argument is the same as [8, Theorem 12] ). Lemma 4.5 Let x and x * be an equilibrium and an m-efficient arbitrary profile, respectively. Then,
where α is some constant.
Proof We focus on an arbitrary job j. Denote i = x j and i * = x * j . As x is an equilibrium, we have
where the second inequality is due to the fact that (z + a) k+1 − z k+1 is an increasing in z (for a > 0) and j :j ≺ i j
; the third inequality is due to Lemma 2.2 (by dividing both sides by
where the first inequality is because x is an equilibrium; the second inequality is due to the sum of Inequality (7) taken over all jobs j; and the fourth inequality is due to case (1b) of Lemma 2.1. Arranging the terms, the lemma follows. Proof Let y * be an optimal assignment and x * be an m-efficient assignment with property of Lemma 4.1. Let x be an equilibrium. Remark that x is a m-efficient assignment since every job can always get a bounded cost. Consider a job j assigned to machine i in profile x. As x is a m-efficient assignment, by the definition of the policy Balance
where the first inequality is because function (a + x) k+1 − x k+1 is increasing; and the last inequality is due to Lemma 2.2 (by dividing both sides by L k+1 (x(i)) and applying z = 
for some constant α. Therefore,
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 4.1. Choosing k = log m, the theorem follows.
APPENDIX 2 Smooth inequalities
Before proving Lemma 2.4, we need to show the following lemma. The technique is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.1 For any non-negative sequences
, and for any positive increasing sequence (q i ) P i=1 , define A i := n 1 q 1 + . . . + n i−1 q i−1 + n i q i and B i := m 1 q 1 + . . .
Proof Denote r j = 1/q j , a j = n j q j and
For convenience we set r P +1 = 0. The inequality could be written as
is a decreasing sequence (e.g. r i − r i+1 ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ P ), it is sufficient to prove that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ P ,
It remains to show Inequality (8) . By Lemma 2.2, we have
, we obtain the inequality in Lemma 2.2 for z = a j /A j ). Therefore,
. Thus, to prove inequality (8) , it is sufficient to prove that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ P ,
Choose µ k = k+1 k+2 and apply case (1b) of Lemma 2.1 (now a(k) = (k+1) k(k+2) and (k − 1)a(k) is bounded by a constant), we deduce that by λ k = Θ(α k (k + 1) k ) for a constant α, the Inequality (9) holds.
Lemma 2.2 For any non-negative sequences
Proof Let A
(1)
i = (n i +. . .+n P ) and B
(1) i 
Therefore, to prove the lemma, it is sufficient to argue that
and
Inequality (10) holds for µ k = k+1 k+2 and λ k = Θ(α k 2 (k+1) 2 ) for some constant α (the proof is similar to that of Lemma 2.1 but in the end, the case (1c) of Lemma 2.1 is used to derive the value of λ k ).
Consider inequality (11) . For convenience set q 0 = 0. The inequality could be rewritten as
As the sequence (q i ) P i=1 is increasing, it is sufficient to prove that
The inequality above could be considered as a corollary of Inequality (10) by rewriting the indices in backward (i → P + 1 − i) and considering the sequence q i = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ P . Precisely, fix an index i and applying Inequality (10) for the sequence q j = 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ P +1−i and two sequences (n j )
, and (m j )
defined as n j = n P +1−j and m i = m P +1−j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ P + 1 − i.
Replacing n j by n j and m j by m j for 1 ≤ j ≤ P + 1 − i, we get Inequality (12). 
where the inequality is because the function x h is increasing. Thus, (k + 1)
Summing the inequalities over 0 ≤ h ≤ k, we obtain
2 Let x be an assignment of jobs to machines. Then, the SPT policy minimizes the knorm of job completion times with respect to this assignment among all feasible policies. Moreover, the EQUI policy induces an objective value at most (2k + 2) 1/k times higher.
Proof Consider a machine i and let N be the number of jobs assigned to i by the profile x. These N jobs are renamed in increasing order of processing times, and since we fixed machine i, for convenience we drop index i in the processing times. So we denote the N processing times as
In any schedule of those jobs, there exist distinct jobs with completion times at least p 1 , p 1 + p 2 , . . . , p 1 + . . . + p h . Hence, the k -norm on the completion times of such jobs is at least
, which is attained by the SPT policy. These jobs are partitioned into different classes where jobs in the same class have the same processing time, i.e., there are n 1 , . . . , n h jobs with processing times q 1 , . . . , q h . In the following, we will prove by induction on the number of classes (i.e parameter h) that the objective value induced by EQUI policy is within (2k + 2) 1/k times the one induced by SPT, or that is, which is straightforward by Lemma 3.1. Now, assume that Inequality (13) holds for h classes of jobs. We will prove that this statement also holds for (h + 1) classes.
Define function q(z) := q h + (q h+1 − q h )z for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Then, all jobs with processing time q h+1 could be seen as having processing time q(1). Define g(z) := 2(k + 1) n h+1 t=1 (A + t · q(z)) k − n h+1 (A + n h+1 q(z)) k where A = n h j=0 n j q j . Consider function f (z) as follows:
(n 0 q 0 + . . . + n j−1 q j−1 + t · q j ) k − h j=1 n j n 0 q 0 + n 1 q 1 + . . . + n j−1 q j−1 + (n j + . . . + n h+1 )q j k Inequality (13) is equivalent to prove that f (1) ≥ 0. By the induction hypothesis, we have f (0) ≥ 0 since for z = 0 there are exactly h classes in the inequality (13) .
Consider the derivative of f (z).
f (z) = g (z) = k(q h+1 − q h ) 2(k + 1) Proof Let j be an arbitrary job. Since x is an equilibrium, c j (x) ≤ c j (x −j , x * j ), thus q j c k j (x) ≤ q j c k j (x −j , x * j ) for all jobs j. Using the smooth argument, in order to prove the lemma, it is sufficient to argue that (14) for some constant α. Applying Lemma 2.1(case (1a)), for any machine i we have
for some constant α. Moreover, by definition of BCOORD, j:x * j =i q j c k j (x −j , x * j ) is upper bounded by the right-hand side of the inequality above. Therefore, Inequality (14) follows. Proof Let y * be an optimal assignment and x * be an m-efficient assignment with property of Lemma 4.1. Then, for any Nash equilibrium x, we have
log k L(y * ). Choosing k = log m, the theorem follows.
Policy CCOORD, Revisited
Lemma 4.2 ([3]) For any integer k ≥ 1, any finite set of non-negative reals A and any real b, the following hold
In the following, we use also an inequality whose the proof is similar to the one in Lemma 2.1. For all real positive numbers a, b, it holds that
Lemma 4.3 Let x be a Nash equilibrium. Then, for any m-efficient profile x * , it holds that 
